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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA” or “Act”)1 is not 
a vehicle for tort reform.2  Nothing in the language or legislative history of the 
PPACA suggest a limitation on future damages available to patients injured as a 
result of medical malpractice.3  The PPACA was neither written to change state 
law on subrogation nor modify the rules prohibiting the introduction of evidence 
pertaining to collateral sources.4  Even advocates for tort reform in the medical 
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Krystal-Rose Perez for their help with this Article.  Thanks are also due to Dean Claudio Grossman 
for his support.  The student work was supported in part by a consultancy with the American
Association for Justice Robert L. Habush Endowment.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
2. An ongoing dialogue suggests that the PPACA can be read as a tort reform statute.  See
generally David I. Auerbach, Paul Heaton & Ian Brantley, How Will the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act Affect Liability Insurance Costs?, RAND CORP. (2014), http://www.rand.org/ 
pubs/research_reports/RR493.html (finding that “[l]iability payments could decrease in states that 
limit awards based on payments from collateral sources. . . .  Medicaid may increase subrogation 
against liability awards.”); Ann S. Levin, The Fate of the Collateral Source Rule After Healthcare 
Reform, 60 UCLA L. REV. 736 (2013); Joseph McGovern & John Morio, Affordable Care Act Has 
Potential to Limit a Defendant’s Exposure for Future Medical Costs in New York Personal Injury 
Litigation, JD SUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ 
affordable-care-act-has-potential-to-lim-90674. 
3. Laura D. Hermer, Aligning Incentives in Accountable Care Organizations: The Role of
Medical Practice Reform, 17 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 271, 272 (2014) (articulating that 
“[t]raditional tort reform simply found no place in the [PPACA]”). 
4. See Adam G. Todd, An Enduring Oddity: The Collateral Source Rule in the Face of Tort
Reform, the Affordable Care Act, and Increased Subrogation, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 965, 982‒
87, 996 (2012); Rebecca Levenson, Comment, Allocating the Costs of Harms to whom They Are 
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malpractice field acknowledge that, rather than a remedial limitation imposed 
upon aggrieved patients, the PPACA concerns health care and insurance.5  The 
only reference to liability limitation or tort reform in the PPACA is the section 
regarding a demonstration project designed to provide funding to states 
developing litigation alternatives or substitutes.6 
The demonstration project provides participating states funding to assess the 
efficiency and reliability of its civil litigation model.7  This hardly constitutes 
federal tort reform.8  While the Act anticipates studying state processes, 
“liability as a tool for quality improvement is not discussed anywhere in the 
[PPACA], and it would appear to have been relegated to a fading player in the 
drama of health care quality improvement.”9 
The legislative history of health care reform provides an even more 
enlightening view on federal tort reform.  As discussed below, there was a 
concerted effort while the bill was navigating the legislative process to 
manufacture limitations on noneconomic and punitive damages in health care 
lawsuits into the PPACA.10  However, these measures were not included in the 
final version of Act.11  When Congress preempts a field or adopts a significant, 
rights-altering policy, it is safe to assume that any major measures would be 
Due: Modifying the Collateral Course Rule After Health Care Reform, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 
940‒47 (2012). 
5. Arthur L. Doenecke, Letter to the Editor, Braley Avoids Obvious Need for Tort Reform, 
THE DES MOINES REGISTER (Nov. 3, 2014, 12:38 AM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/ 
story/opinion/readers/2014/11/03/us-senate-braley-avoids-obvious-need-tort-reform/18398755/ 
(emphasizing that “[i]t comes as no surprise that Bruce Braley, a trial lawyer by profession, likes 
the Affordable Care Act so much.  Nowhere in the 2,000 plus pages of the law is there any mention 
of tort reform.  The [PPACA] seems tailor-made for trial attorneys.”); Angie Drobnic Holan, Tort 
Reform in the Health Care Law? No, POLITIFACT (Jan. 21, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.politifact. 
com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/jan/21/anthony-weiner/tort-reform-health-care-law-no/; Dr. 
Anthony Youn, Health Care Act’s Glaring Omission: Liability Reform, CNN (Oct. 5, 2012, 8:43 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/05/health/youn-liability-reform/ (protesting that “for all of the 
Obama administration’s work in creating this 906-page federal law, there is one glaring omission 
that could decrease the cost of health care and help relieve the upcoming physician shortage.  
Medical liability reform.”); Medical Liability Reform NOW!, AM. MED. ASS’N 1, 25 (2015), ama-
assn.org/go/mlrnow. 
6. Section 10607 of the Act “authorize[s] the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
award demonstration grants to states for the development, implementation, and evaluation of 
alternatives to current tort litigation.”  CHRIS L. PETERSON ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 3962 AND 
SENATE-PASSED H.R. 3590, 100 (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/CRS_Rpt_Comp_ 
HR3962_HR3590.pdf. 
7. See id.
8. See Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation as a
Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 66, 104 (2011) (“Medical liability reform is only a minor 
component of the [PPACA], with demonstration projects to be funded.”). 
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 32‒34 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
2015] The Affordable Care Act Is Not Tort Reform 3 
clearly evident, discussed at length, and debated extensively.12  It is even more 
likely that after such a significant bill is signed into law, these rights-altering 
measures would be celebrated by the majority and bemoaned by the minority.  
That was, however, not the case with PPACA.  While federal tort reform was 
debated extensively, the stark fact is that “the [PPACA] does not generally 
federalize medical liability[,] . . . reform litigation[,] or malpractice insurance 
generally.”13  Limiting a patient’s civil litigation rights or enhancing the options 
available to defendants in medical malpractice cases is absent from the Act.  
Instead, “the [PPACA] creates strong pressures for providers to integrate and 
coordinate their delivery of health care for Medicare recipients through centers, 
demonstration projects, and Medicare reimbursement incentives.”14  This hardly 
constitutes tort reform. 
Those who believe the PPACA incorporates federal tort reform principles 
further suggest that the most notable and important aspect of the PPACA—the 
health insurance mandate—serves to simultaneously limit damages in medical 
malpractice cases and change the rules on admissibility of collateral sources.15  
A tort judgment, or so goes the argument, should not cover future medical costs 
because federally mandated health insurance policies cannot cover these types 
of costs.16  The PPACA coverage, thereby, is the standard measure of damages 
in medical malpractice cases.  The reasoning continues by suggesting that 
evidence of current or future coverage—currently deemed inadmissible in a 
number of states under the collateral source rule—should be rendered 
admissible, could serve to offset damages attributable to direct costs, or, at least, 
serve as a guideline.17 
Taken together, if insurance plans will not cover future medical expenses 
under the Act, then those expenses cannot be factored into a personal injury 
award because they exceed the scope of the minimal coverage the PPACA 
requires.  This postulation is simple, yet incorrect, because the PPACA does not 
impose limitations on future medical expenses in personal injury malpractice 
cases by virtue of its insurance mandate.18 
First, there is nothing in the PPACA that mandates or even contemplates that 
outcome.  The idea that the PPACA changes the rules on the admissibility of 
12. See infra notes 33‒34 and accompanying text.
13. Furrow, supra note 8, at 104.
14. Id. at 105.
15. See sources cited supra note 2.
16. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
17. Mark Yagerman & Max Bookman, How Obamacare May Limit Projected Expenses in
Personal Injury Life Care Plans, (2014), https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/Yagerman 
Bookan.HowObamacareMayLimitProjectedExpensesInPersonalInjuryLifeCarePlans.pdf. 
18. See infra notes 19‒23 and accompanying text.
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collateral sources or limits future damages is nothing more than the hope of those 
scavenging for vindication, and not the reality of the PPACA.19 
Second, the few cases that have considered this contention have rejected it.  In 
Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hospital,20 the plaintiff, prevailing in a malpractice 
action, received both current and future compensatory damages.21  The 
defendant-hospital argued that if the plaintiff were to receive future costs, the 
collateral source rule limitation should be modified in accordance with a state 
statute.22  Because the PPACA rules on limitations of future “federally mandated 
. . . insurance options makes the prospect of future health insurance coverage for 
plaintiff anything but speculative[,]” the hospital argued, evidence of the 
plaintiff’s then current insurance should be admissible.23 
The court, dismissing the defendant’s arguments, recognized that the 
possibility of future medical insurance as contemplated in the PPACA did not 
form a basis to conclude that the plaintiff’s future needs would be met.24  The 
court considered that the PPACA’s individual mandate “standing alone, is 
irrelevant to prove reasonably certain insurance coverage . . . because it has no 
tendency in reason to prove that specific items of future care and treatment will 
be covered, the amount of that coverage, or the duration of that coverage.”25 
Leung was exactly on point: the PPACA may not have been designed to cover 
all future losses a defendant caused and a plaintiff experiences, but it certainly 
does not limit a judgment or future needs.  Introducing a current insurance 
policy, in contravention of the collateral source rule, is erroroneous.26  Further, 
introducing a current insurance policy to show what is unavailable through the 
PACCA insurance later on—and, more importantly, what should not be 
available in a personal injury case involving medical malpractice—is beyond 
speculative, fantasy, or perhaps defensive magical thinking. 
19. See, e.g., supra note 2 (predicting a possible reduction in damages exposure to personal
injury defendants as a result of the PPACA). 
20. Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hosp., No. B204908, 2013 WL 221654 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 22,
2013), review denied (May 1, 2013).  On appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 
the Second District Court of Appeal did not address the issue of the admissibility of future medical 
costs.  Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hosp., 282 P.3d 1250, 1261 (Cal. 2012).  The California Supreme 
Court, however, reversed the court of appeals, ordering consideration of future insurance coverage 
in calculating damages.  Id.  On remand, the appellate court held, nonetheless, that the “mere 
possibility that private insurance coverage will continue, and the availability of government 
programs for the purchase of insurance, do not, in themselves, constitute relevant, admissible 
evidence of the future insurance benefits that a plaintiff is reasonably certain to receive.”  Leung, 
2013 WL 221654, at *11. 
21. Leung, 2013 WL 221654, at *13.
22. Id. at *3.
23. Id. at *10.
24. Id. at *11.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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There is another way to assess this contorted interpretation of the PPACA.  
While the PPACA was intended to provide universal health coverage,27 the 
belief that every future cost associated with an act of malpractice would be 
covered by the minimal health insurance policy under the PPACA is at odds with 
reality.  Future unanticipated costs associated with various types of therapy (e.g., 
occupational or physical) are not covered in any meaningful way by most 
insurance policies.28  Future pain, loss of mobility, decline in function and 
appearance, and many other long-term effects of instances of malpractice are not 
covered in every health insurance policy the PPACA contemplates.  However, 
these maladies are, and should be, covered in a malpractice judgment or 
settlement.  The limits of the PPACA do not affect the capacity of courts to 
ensure that these malpractice-induced needs are met. 
I.  LEGISLATIVE PATH OF THE PPACA DOES NOT INCLUDE CHANGES TO TORT 
LIABILITY 
The PPACA was introduced into the 111th U.S. Congress in September 
2009,29 and passed the U.S. Senate that December.30  The Act then passed the 
U.S. House of Representatives with certain changes on March 21, 2010, and 
President Obama signed the bill into law shortly thereafter.31  During the Senate 
debate, there was considerable political pressure to incorporate tort limitation 
language (i.e., tort reform), particularly a provision capping damages.32  
Proponents direct attention to § 6801 of the PPACA, which suggests that it was 
the “[s]ense of the Senate” that “health care reform presents an opportunity to 
address issues related to medical malpractice and medical liability insurance.”33  
During the floor debates, notably Republican Senate Minority Leader Mitch 
McConnell contended that the health care proposals under consideration failed 
to include any language limiting malpractice liability and urged his colleagues 
                                                     
 27. Two years into the PPACA, there were still thirty-two million people without health 
insurance.  Jason Millman, Who Is Still Uninsured Under ObamaCare—and Why, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/11/12/who-is-still-
uninsured-under-obamacare-and-why/. 
 28. How to Avoid Surprise Medical Bills, THE WALL ST. J., http://guides.wsj.com/health/ 
health-costs/how-to-avoid-surprise-medical-bills/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). 
 29. H.R. 3590 (111th): Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3590 (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Stephan F. Hayes, Obama Taps Ex-Trial Lawyer Lobbyist to Look at Tort Reform, 
THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Sept. 10, 2009, 1:36 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/ 
TWSFP/2009/09/obama_taps_extrial_lawyer_lobb.asp; In Gesture of Bipartisanship, President 
Obama to Discuss Medical Malpractice Reform Tonight, ABC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2009, 4:36 PM), 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/09/in-gesture-of-bipartisanship-president-obama-to 
-discuss-medical-malpractice-reform-tonight.html. 
 33. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 6801(a) (2010) (as 
amended by the Senate and House). 
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to rectify it.34  Nevertheless, the Senate version of the bill upon its return to the 
House did not include any tort reform provisions.35 
After Senate passage, the House Rules Committee took up tort reform and the 
PPACA shortly before President Obama signed the bill into law.  The 
Committee debated, but failed to pass, a proposal that would have added a 
section “based on the medical liability reforms adopted in Texas.”36  Subsequent 
amendments touched on the subject without changing the fact that the Act does 
not limit tort liability.37 
Even before President Obama took office, the 110th Congress held seventeen 
hearings on access to healthcare,38 often focused on enhanced subrogation39 and 
relaxation of collateral source restrictions.40  Yet, none of these proposals made 
it into the PPACA.41  Likewise, an effort to place caps on damages was 
thwarted.42  Other efforts to limit liability, including the America’s Healthy 
Future Act that “would have provided incentives through Medicaid for states to 
enact medical malpractice reforms,” also failed to pass.43  In short, tort reform 
efforts were explicit and were explicitly rejected. 
While President Obama paid lip service to tort reform supporters throughout 
the health care reform debate, he did not take the opportunity to speak on the 
topic when he signed the PPACA.44  Later, speaking before a meeting of the 
American Medical Association, President Obama noted that there are “legally 
34. Catharine Richert, McConnell Gets It Right on Medical Malpractice Reform, 
POLITIFACT.COM (Dec. 2, 2009, 6:08 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/ 
2009/dec/02/mitch-mcconnell/mcconnell-gets-it-right-medical-malpractice-reform/. 
35. Id.
36. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, H.R. REP. NO. 111-299, pt. 1, at 1175‒76 (2009)
(detailing Rep. Burgess’s proposed amendment which was similar to measures in place in Texas 
since 2003); see also Archive of Summary of Amendments Submitted to the Rules Committee for 
H.R. 4872—Reconciliation Act of 2010, U.S. HOUSE OF REP. COMM. ON RULES (Mar. 20,  
2010, 6:20 PM), http://democrats.rules.house.gov/amendment-summary/summary-amendments-
submitted-rules-committee-hr-4872-reconciliation-act-2010. 
37. See, e.g., H.R. 5243, 111th Cong. § 3513(b) (2010); SEQUESTER REPLACEMENT 
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2012, H.R. REP. NO. 112-470, at 54, 85 (the section on liability reform 
that would have severely limited future damages, but was not passed). 
38. H.R. REP. NO. 111-299, pt. 1, at 328 (2009).
39. H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 136 (2009).
40. See Todd, supra note 4, at 982 n.131.
41. See id. at 968‒69.
42. LOUISE SLAUGHTER, COMM. ON RULES, H.R. REP. NO. 111-330, at 85‒87 (2009).  In its
initial draft, the Affordable Health Care for America Act and the Medicare Physician Payment 
Reform Act of 2009—H.R. 3962—included caps on noneconomic and punitive damages and 
limited attorney fees; however, it also included a generous section on patient injury compensation 
that severely limited subrogation rights.  Id. 
43. S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 449 (2009).
44. Richert, supra note 34; see also Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President and Vice President at Signing of the Health Insurance Reform Bill (Mar. 23, 2010) 
(containing no comments in the remarks by the President regarding tort reform). 
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vulnerable” doctors and other health care providers, but that was the extent of 
his comments on the subject.45  President Obama’s inaction did not go unnoticed.  
Howard Dean, former Democratic National Committee Chairman, noted: 
When you go to pass a really enormous bill like that, the more stuff 
you put in it, the more enemies you make, right?  And the reason that 
tort reform is not in the bill is because the people who wrote it did not 
want to take on the trial lawyers in addition to everyone else they were 
taking on.46 
Another bill, the Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries 
and Pension Relief Act of 2010,47 initially mandated the establishment of 
standards for the “coordination and subrogation of benefits and reimbursement 
of payments in cases of qualified health benefits and plans.”48  However, the 
subrogation of benefits language was removed before the bill was ultimately 
enacted.49  Consequently, there is nothing in the PPACA or subsequent 
legislation dictating new terms or criteria for subrogation of benefits or collateral 
source standards at the federal level. 
II.  INITIATIVES BEYOND INSURANCE TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE 
Beyond the insurance programs and substantive changes in insurance 
coverage (e.g., eliminating the practice of denying coverage based on a pre-
existing condition),50 the PPACA contemplates the possibility of various 
training programs and pilot initiatives.51  These programs, central to the massive 
effort to reconfigure health care, seek to allow most patients to maintain their 
current health insurance plans and current doctor-patient relationships.52 
                                                     
 45. See Richert, supra note 34. 
 46. In Gesture of Bipartisanship, President Obama to Discuss Medical Malpractice Reform, 
supra note 32. 
 47. Pub. L. No. 111-192, 124 Stat. 1280 (2010). 
 48. H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 236 (as introduced in the House on Oct. 29, 2009). 
 49. See Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-192, 124 Stat. 1280 (showing omission of proposed § 236 in enacted 
legislation). 
 50. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (2012). 
 51. See, e.g., id. at §§ 3023, 5301‒5302 (2010) (providing examples of pilot and training 
programs); see also ANDREW COHEN, U. MASS. MED. SCH., CTR. FOR HEALTH L. & ECON.,  
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (H.R. 3590)—PILOT PROGRAMS, 
DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS, AND GRANTS, 5‒15 (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.umassmed.edu/ 
uploadedFiles/CWM_CHLE/Landing_Pages/Pilot%20Programs%20Demonstration%20Project%
20and%20Grants%20in%20PPACA%204-26-10%20Final.pdf (detailing specific sections within 
the PPACA that provide funding for pilot programs to improve quality of healthcare access and 
training to expand the healthcare workforce). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (2011) (seeking to secure the right of individuals to maintain existing 
coverage).  Suffice it to say that there is some disagreement on whether the PPACA achieved either 
of these goals.  See, e.g., Peter Roff, Obama Lied, My Heath Care Died, US NEWS (Oct. 11,  
2013, 1:05 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2013/10/11/obama-lied-i-lost-
my-health-insurance-plan-due-to-obamacare; If Your Grandfathered Health Plan is Changed or 
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In conjunction with these lofty goals, the PPACA also provides for a modest 
non-compulsory program designed to assist states considering options to 
streamline the healthcare process and attempting to reduce the cost of in-state 
malpractice claims (e.g., using arbitration to settle disputes between doctors and 
their patients who are victims of medical malpractice).53  The premise for this 
program is mistakenly that both tort law and the civil justice system are 
fundamentally flawed.  This troubling bias is articulated by Professor Abigail R. 
Moncrieff, who stated that “[i]f market forces or administrative enforcement 
works as well as or better than private litigation, then we ought to embrace rather 
than resist the Court’s assault on private actions.  In that case, private actions 
might inefficiently replicate regulatory deterrence.”54 
This initiative is the closest the PPACA comes to suggesting tort reform.  
Notwithstanding the fact that compulsory arbitration in medical malpractice 
cases violates individuals’ Seventh Amendment right to a trial in an Article III 
court,55 even permitting states under the PPACA to consider this option is a 
terrible idea.56 
Beyond this minor option in the Act, the most important, obvious, and highly 
ambitious goal of the PPACA is the mandate to create an accessible insurance 
acquisition system resulting in health coverage for all and reducing health care 
delivery costs in the long term.57  This mandate, not the crabbed and distorted 
reading of a limitation on damages, is the ultimate goal of the PPACA. 
This greater goal of insuring every U.S. citizen is inconceivably vast and 
particularly challenging.  The number of programs required—and the 
                                                     
Cancelled, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/current-plan-changed-or-cancelled/ 
(last visited Aug. 12, 2015).  Nonetheless, it is not the goal of this paper to assess whether these 
promises have been fulfilled. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(a) (2012) (providing funds “for the development, implementation, 
and evaluation of alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes over injuries allegedly 
caused by health care providers or health care organizations”). 
 54. Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why (and How) It 
Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2323, 2327 (2010). 
 55. See generally Mark E. Bunditz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2004); Jennifer Schulz, Comment, Arbitrating Arbitrarily: How 
the U.S. Supreme Court Empowered the Arbitrator at the Expense of the Judge and the Average 
Joe, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1269 (2011); David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping 
Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F.L. REV. 49 (2003); 
Cory Tischbein, Comment, Animating the Seventh Amendment in Contemporary Plaintiffs’ 
Litigation: The Rule, or the Exception?, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 232 (2013) (criticizing the Supreme 
Court for favoring arbitration, undervaluing the Seventh Amendment, and minimizing the 
importance and necessity of jury trials). 
 56. See Tischbein, supra note 55, at 233‒34.  Implementation of this initiative is suggested 
through the Public Health Services Act, which authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services “to award demonstration grants to states for the development . . . of alternatives to current 
tort litigation.”  42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(a) (2012). 
 57. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
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commitment to a better process and outcome—remains historic.58  There is no 
room for a self-interested anti-patient edict abolishing future medical costs in 
medical malpractice cases. 
Naturally, in thousands of pages of legislation, it is possible that a given 
section of text scurries into a shadowy corner of a bill, waiting behind dense 
legislative undergrowth, which would surprise supporters of a bill.  Thus far, 
such stealth language has yet to be found in the PPACA.  While the PPACA is 
a complex law, it does not limit patient rights, decrease accountability for 
physician misconduct, reconfigure the notions of a fair trial by changing 
collateral source doctrine, or change current law on subrogation by insurance 
companies. 
The PPACA funds both the Community Health Center Fund and the National 
Health Service Corps.59  The Act underwrites the cost of the Prevention and 
Public Health Fund, which develops programs on disease prevention and 
wellness, such as the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund and the 
Health Insurance Reform Implementation Fund.60  Beginning in 2010, “the 
[PPACA] included more than $100 billion in direct appropriations over the 10-
year period” essentially designed to adjust, support, and promote health 
insurance, health care, Medicare, public and community health initiatives, child 
and long-term care, and medical research.61  A twisted and biased interpretation 
of collateral source or subrogation involving third party claims is hardly the 
same concept. 
As for the state programs, the PPACA authorizes the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) to award states five-year grants to develop 
and test “alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes over injuries 
allegedly caused” by health care professionals.62  In order to apply for an HHS 
grant, a state must submit an application to the HHS Secretary outlining its non-
litigation alternative.63  Each application undergoes “rigorous peer review by 
independent, scientific experts[,]” and the “[a]ward decisions . . . reflect peer 
review scores, program balance, technical merit[,] and feasibility.”64 
                                                     
 58. See generally C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41301, 
APPROPRIATIONS AND FUND TRANSFERS IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2015), https://www.fas. 
org/sgp/crs/misc/R41301.pdf (detailing the forty-seven different mandatory appropriations of the 
ACA). 
 59. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); REDHEAD, supra note 58, at 4. 
 60. REDHEAD, supra note 58, at 4. 
 61. Id. at 3‒4. 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(a)‒(b) (2012). 
 63. Id. § 280g-15(c)‒(d). 
 64. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Patient Safety and Medical Liability Reform 
Demonstration (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-patient-
safety-and-medical-liability-reform-demonstration. 
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The PPACA provides specific requirements of what constitutes an 
“alternative[] to current tort litigation.”65  Such alternatives must facilitate 
dispute resolution and “promote a reduction of health care errors by encouraging 
the collection and analysis of patient safety data related to disputes by 
organizations that engage in efforts to improve patient safety and the quality of 
health care.”66  Further, states must show that their plan furthers alternative 
dispute resolution, the disclosure of medical errors, and patient education 
concerning the difference between tort litigation and other available alternatives, 
while still allowing patients to sue.67  The state plan, in addition, must neither 
conflict with current state tort law nor place limitations on patients’ legal rights 
or access to the justice system.68  Finally, state grantees must provide the 
Secretary of HHS with annual reports that evaluate the effectiveness of the 
alternative(s).69  This, again, is hardly suggestive of federal tort reform.  The 
behavior of the federal government under the scope of the PPACA further serves 
to support this conclusion. 
In June 2010, the Agency for Health Research and Quality opened a 
solicitation for more grant applications.70  However, Congress did not 
appropriate the requested funding in 2012 and 2013.71  Moreover, President 
Obama’s 2015 fiscal budget does not include any explicit funding for these state 
run medical liability reform programs.72  The American Medical Association has 
called on Congress to make funds available for these grants.73 
In addition, there was an unsuccessful quest in the PPACA debate to 
encourage state pilot projects to include damage caps, which is classic tort 
reform.74  Opponents overwhelmingly thwarted this suggestion, arguing that 
damage caps are patently unfair and reduce accountability, which, according to 
the Congressional Budget Office, directly results in an increase of patient 
deaths.75  There is no evidence to support the belief that capping damages serves 
                                                     
 65. Affordable Care Act § 10607; 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(c)(2). 
 66. Affordable Care Act § 10607; 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(c)(1)(B). 
 67. Affordable Care Act § 10607; 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(c)(2). 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(c)(2)(H)‒(I). 
 69. Id. § 280g-15(e)(1). 
 70. Medical Liability Reform NOW!, AM. MED. ASS’N 1, 33 (2015), ama-assn.org/go/ 
mlrnow. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Leonard J. Nelson, III, et al., Medical Liability and Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH 
MATRIX 443, 476‒77, 484 (2011) (finding that the push to encourage damage caps was led by 
Republicans and physician groups, but evidence showing the effectiveness of damage caps on 
health care costs was questionable).  Furthermore, President Obama has argued that medical 
liability reform should be included in health care reform, but his support does not extend to damage 
caps.  Id. at 504‒05. 
 75. Sen. Dick Durbin on Medical Malpractice Reform at White House Health Summit, in 
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2010, 5:12 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
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as a deterrence measure.76  By failing to deter instances of malpractice, a federal 
cap on medical liability damages, therefore, would not significantly reduce the 
costs of heath care.77  In the end, the cap effort was ultimately not included in 
the PPACA. 
As was the case with other efforts to pervert the PPACA and utilize its 
language to lessen patient rights, the very essence of the arguments forwarded 
by proponents suggesting that the PPACA contemplates tort reform were, in 
fact, considered by Congress and wholly rejected. 
III.  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBROGATION, THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE, 
AND THE PPACA 
As mentioned earlier, one might conclude that because PPACA-approved 
insurance does not require compensation for future medical costs, and many 
people will only have the PPACA-mandated health insurance,78 the source of 
funds should be known at trial, in contravention of the collateral source rule.  
Because insurers’ recoupment through subrogation will be bounded by that 
limitation, the PPACA, in effect, limits tort liability.  This tortured reasoning is 
simply incorrect. 
Each state has its own subrogation and collateral source policies.79  Some 
states permit only one of these doctrines, some permit both, while others prohibit 
both.80  While the PPACA implicates “normative benefits accrued by continuing 
to impose the collateral source rule[,]” it does not stabilize the various state 
approaches to subrogation.81  The importance of this distinctive matter is best 
framed by Professor Adam Todd, who states: “[t]he restrictions on full 
subrogation found in many jurisdictions allow the collateral source rule to 
                                                     
2010/02/25/AR2010022504290.html.  As doctors and hospitals lose accountability, according to a 
study by the Congressional Budget Office, approximately 4,800 patients will die every year.  Id.  
Senator Durbin argues that this finding, in conjunction with the Institute of Medicine’s finding that 
98,000 Americans die each year due to medical malpractice, justifies inclusion of medical errors 
into the bill.  Id. 
 76. See Nelson, III, et al., supra note 74, at 448 (arguing that damage “caps do not adequately 
address the shortcomings of the current medical liability system with respect to both its deterrence 
and compensation goals”). 
 77. See id. at 476 (concluding “[a]t this time it is not clear that a cap will significantly reduce 
health care costs . . . as result of federal medical liability reform”). 
 78. See id. at 450 (finding that PPACA will always have a source of payment for future health 
care costs, even the insured who are unemployed). 
 79. See Todd, supra note 4, at 988 (finding that the collateral source rule and subrogation 
have a symbiotic relationship determined by the jurisdiction’s relevant subrogation rule.  Any 
proposed federal change to the collateral source rule would have to take into account each 
jurisdiction’s subrogation rules). 
 80. See id. at 990‒92 (finding that the common law rule of permitting contractual subrogation 
has come under assault by courts and legislatures who have adopted either one, both, or none of the 
subrogation and collateral source policies). 
 81. Todd, supra note 4, at 968 (finding that the Affordable Care Act does not settle the various 
and conflicting state approaches to subrogation and the collateral source rule). 
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survive because the rule plays an important administrative and equitable 
function in the determination of subrogation rights.  As such, the rule is 
particularly important when full subrogation is prohibited or restricted.”82  
“Abrogating the collateral source rule, absent subrogation,” Professor Todd 
posits, entitles a defendant to a reduction in liability, and, as a result, “allows the 
defendant to escape the full cost of the risk-taking behavior.”83 
A.  The Collateral Source Rule 
In 1854, the collateral source rule was first recognized in the United States in 
Monticello v. Mollison.84  In Monticello, the Court correctly recognized that a 
person’s own insurance, like any other personal asset, should not enter into a 
determination of what should be paid by a party found to have caused the harm.85  
The Monticello ruling has since been diluted in numerous states.86  A state 
survey shows a remarkable variation in the treatment of collateral sources.87 
States apply the collateral source rule inconsistently,88 and many have adopted 
caps in medical malpractice cases.89  Some states recognize the entire collateral 
source rule, including Arizona,90 Arkansas,91 District of Columbia,92 Hawaii,93 
                                                     
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 986. 
 84. 58 U.S. 152, 155 (1854) (finding that “[t]he contract with the insurer is in the nature of a 
wager between third parties, with which the trespasser has no concern”); see Michael W. Cromwell, 
Cutting the Fat Out of Health-Care Costs, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 585, 589 (2010). 
 85. Monticello, 58 U.S. at 155. 
 86. See Richard C. Witzel Jr., The Collateral Source Rule and State-Provided Special 
Education and Therapy, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 697, 701‒05 (1997) (describing the development of the 
collateral source doctrine and its role in tort reform). 
 87. See Lori A. Roberts, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Wrongful Abrogation of the Collateral 
Source Rule in Personal Injury Cases, 31 REV. LITIG. 99, 101‒02 (2012). 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability 
Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 431 (2004). 
 90. See Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487, 491 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that 
the collateral source rule is “well established” in Arizona); but see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
565 (2014) (permitting collateral source rule evidence to be introduced to the jury in malpractice 
actions). 
 91. See Jewell v. Fletcher, 377 S.W.3d 176, 190 (Ark. 2010) (permitting the collateral source 
rule, while recognizing that double recovery may result). 
 92. See Dist. of Columbia v. Jackson, 451 A.2d 867, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying the 
common law collateral source rule within the District of Columbia). 
 93. See Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1154 (Haw. 2004) (applying the common law 
collateral source rule in Hawaii). 
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Illinois,94 Kentucky,95 Louisiana,96 Maine,97 Mississippi,98 Montana,99 
Nebraska,100 New Hampshire,101 New Mexico,102 North Dakota,103 South 
Carolina,104 South Dakota,105 Vermont,106 Virginia,107 West Virginia,108 and 
Utah.109 
                                                     
 94. See Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1030 (Ill. 2008) (holding that Illinois permits the 
use of the collateral source rule). 
 95. See Leighton v. CSX Transp., Inc., 338 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that 
the collateral source rule is followed in Kentucky). 
 96. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 409 (2013) (prohibiting introduction of collateral source 
evidence to jury); see also Suhor v. Lagasse, 770 So. 2d 422, 426‒27 (La. Ct. App. 2000) 
(prohibiting application of the collateral source rule to federal aid programs, such as Medicare or 
Medicaid). 
 97. See Potvin v. Seven Elms, Inc., 628 A.2d 115, 116 (Me. 1993) (permitting the collateral 
source rule and broadening the application even beyond tort actions); but see Werner v. Lane, 393 
A.2d 1329, 1335‒36 (Me. 1978) (applying the collateral source rule, but holding with proper 
discretion that the judge can allow collateral source evidence under certain circumstances). 
 98. See Busick v. St. John, 856 So. 2d 304, 309 (Miss. 2003) (stating that the collateral source 
rule is followed in Mississippi). 
 99. See Thomsen v. State by & Through Dep’t of Highways, 833 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Mont. 
1992) (prohibiting the introduction of collateral source evidence to the jury). 
 100. See Mahoney v. Neb. Methodist Hosp., 560 N.W.2d 451, 457 (Neb. 1997) (recognizing 
application of the collateral source rule in Nebraska); Huenink v. Collins, 147 N.W.2d 508, 509 
(Neb. 1966) (citing the collateral source rule in rejection of appellant’s argument). 
 101. See Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 323 A.2d 906 (N.H. 1974) (holding that New 
Hampshire observes the collateral source rule); but see Cyr v. J.I. Case Co., 652 A.2d 685, 688 
(N.H. 1994) (holding that collateral source evidence may still be admissible for another purpose). 
 102. See Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 526 P.2d 430, 434‒35 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) 
(holding that the collateral source rule does not reduce damages recoverable from the tortfeasor, 
but collateral source evidence may be admissible to the jury for another purpose). 
 103. See Keller v. Gama, 378 N.W.2d 867, 868 (N.D. 1985) (upholding North Dakota’s use of 
the collateral source rule). 
 104. See Estate of Rattenni v. Grainger, 379 S.E.2d 890 (S.C. 1989) (stating that South 
Carolina follows the collateral source rule). 
 105. See Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 536 (S.D. 2007) (prohibiting introduction of 
collateral source evidence to the jury). 
 106. See Windsor Sch. Dist. v. State, 956 A.2d 528, 542 (Vt. 2008) (applying the collateral 
source rule, which is recognized in Vermont). 
 107. See Radvany v. Davis, 551 S.E.2d 347, 348 (Va. 2001) (prohibiting introduction of 
collateral source evidence to the jury). 
 108. See Kenney v. Liston, 760 S.E.2d 434, 446 (W. Va. 2014) (prohibiting introduction of 
collateral source evidence to the jury). 
 109. See Wilson v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 289 P.3d 369, 391 (Utah 2012) (holding that the jury 
cannot take the collateral source rule into account for jury verdict). 
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Other states have abrogated the collateral source rule, including Alabama,110 
California,111 Connecticut,112 Georgia,113 Idaho,114 Michigan,115 Ohio,116 Rhode 
Island,117 Tennessee,118 Utah,119 and Washington.120 
Finally, some states permit use of the collateral source rule subject to various 
limitations, including Alaska,121 Colorado,122 Delaware,123 Florida,124 
                                                     
 110. ALA. CODE § 6-5-545 (2014) (abrogating collateral source rule for evidence admissible 
at trial); see also Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223, 233 (Ala. 2000) (holding that the abrogation of 
the collateral source rule under § 6-5-545 is constitutional). 
 111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West 2014) (abrogating the collateral source rule in medical 
malpractice cases). 
 112. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225a (2014) (permitting the admission of collateral sources at 
trial); see also Jones v. Kramer, 838 A.2d 170, 177 (Conn. 2004) (narrowly interpreting § 52-225a 
to limit collateral source payments to those specifically corresponding to damages included in the 
jury’s verdict). 
 113. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-1 (2014) (prohibiting the receipt of benefits from sources other 
than the defendant from operating to diminish the plaintiff’s recovery of damages); see also 
Anepohl v. Ferber, 415 S.E.2d 9, 10 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (prohibiting admission of collateral source 
evidence to a jury). 
 114. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (West 2014) (abrogating the collateral source rule by 
requiring the decuation of payments from damage awards). 
 115. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6303 (2014) (permitting collateral source evidence to be 
introduced to a jury). 
 116. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.41 (West 2015) (replacing the common law collateral 
source rule in Ohio); Jaques v. Manton, 928 N.E.2d 434, 439 (Ohio 2010) (holding that the trial 
court erred in refusing to introduce collateral source evidence to the jury). 
 117. TIT. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-19-34.1 (West 2014) (permitting introduction of 
collateral source evidence to the jury). 
 118. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-119 (2014) (abrogating the collateral source rule in medical 
malpractice cases); see also State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hurley, 31 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tenn. 2000) 
(holding that the collateral source rule is not applicable in workers compensation cases). 
 119. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-405 (West 2014) (abrogating the collateral source rule in 
medical malpractice cases); see also Wilson v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 289 P.3d 369, 384 (Utah 2012) 
(applying Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-405). 
 120. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080 (2015) (replacing the common law collateral source rule in 
the context of health injuries); Adcox v. Children’s Orthopedic Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 864 P.2d 921, 
936 (Wash. 1993) (finding that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to hear collateral 
source evidence but holding that the error was harmless). 
 121. See Jones v. Bowie Indus., 282 P.3d 316, 328 (Alaska 2012) (holding that collateral source 
evidence should be excluded unless it is highly probative of malingering). 
 122. See Roberts, supra note 87, at 125 (discussing the Colorado legislature’s provision for a 
“contract exception” so that the trial court can apply the collateral source rule for certain benefits 
following a damages verdict). 
 123. See Miller v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. 2010) 
(prohibiting evidence that the injured party received compensation or payment for tort-related 
injuries from a source other than the tortfeasor); but see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 6862 (2014) 
(providing jurors factors to consider when collateral source evidence has been introduced at trial). 
 124. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(1) (West 2015) (allowing the court to reduce the award by 
the total paid by some collateral sources); Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 800 So. 2d 197, 203 (Fla. 
2001) (prohibiting the admission of collateral source evidence). 
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Indiana,125 Iowa,126 Kansas,127 Louisiana,128 Massachusetts,129 Minnesota,130 
Missouri,131 New York,132 North Carolina,133 Oklahoma,134 Oregon,135 
Pennsylvania,136 Texas,137 Wisconsin,138 and Wyoming.139 
                                                     
 125. See Ind. Code Ann. § 34-44-1-2 (permitting some collateral source evidence in personal 
injury and wrongful death cases to reduce the award). 
 126. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.14 (2015) (permitting some collateral source evidence); but 
see Collins v. King, 545 N.W.2d 310, 312 (Iowa 1996) (prohibiting evidence of loss of earnings 
from being introduced to the jury). 
 127. See Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. ONEOK, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 442 (Kan. 2006) 
(permitting the collateral source rule, but allowing a setoff in the amount defendants paid to settle 
plaintiff insurers’ subrogation claim). 
 128. See Suhor v. Lagasse, 770 So. 2d 422, 423 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (prohibiting application 
of the collateral source rule to expenses written off by the operation of law governing Medicare). 
 129. See Corsetti v. Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793, 802 (Mass. 1985) (holding that evidence of 
collateral source income may be admissible in a tort action at the discretion of the trial judge). 
 130. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.251 (West 2015) (prohibiting the introduction of collateral 
source evidence, while permitting the court to reduce damage awards by offsetting some collateral 
source payments received by the plaintiff). 
 131. MO. REV. STAT. § 490.715 (2015) (prohibiting introduction of collateral source evidence 
to the jury, while permitting court to evaluate such evidence to determine the value of medical 
services). 
 132. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 4545 (McKinney 2015) (prohibiting the introduction of collateral 
source evidence to a jury, while providing that the court may reduce a jury award to offset receipt 
of some collateral sources). 
 133. See Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (N.C. 1987) (prohibiting introduction of 
collateral source evidence of public benefits to a jury). 
 134. Estrada v. Port City Props., 258 P.3d 495, 505‒07 (Okla. 2011) (applying the collateral 
source rule to retaliatory discharge proceedings prohibiting introduction of collateral source 
evidence of unemployment benefits to a jury). 
 135. Gragg v. Hutchinson, 176 P.3d 407, 410 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (prohibiting collateral source 
evidence in civil actions for damages resulting from bodily injury or death); but see OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 31.580 (West 2015) (allowing court to reduce damages by considering select collateral 
sources). 
 136. See Gallagher v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 883 A.2d 550, 557 (Pa. 2005) (permitting the 
introduction of collateral source evidence only when evidence of recovery is a material issue in the 
case). 
 137. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.0105 (West 2014) (permitting the collateral 
source rule while limiting plaintiff’s recovery to expenses that have been or must be paid by or for 
plaintiff); Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.2d 390, 399‒400 (Tex. 2011) (applying statute to 
limit evidence of damages to recoverable expenses). 
 138. WIS. STAT. § 893.55 (2015) (explicitly permitting collateral source evidence to be 
introduced to the jury in medical malpractice actions); see also Lagerstrom v. Myrtle Werth 
Hospital-Mayo Health Sys., 700 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Wis. 2005) (applying Section 893.55 to allow 
collateral source evidence to be introduced to determine the reasonable value of medical services). 
 139. Garnick v. Teton Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 39 P.3d 1034, 1042 (Wyo. 2002) (prohibiting the 
introduction of collateral source evidence to the jury, but holding that the trial court’s error of 
admitting such evidence in this case was harmless). 
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B.  Subrogation 
Subrogation varies from state to state but, at a basic level, all iterations support 
“[t]he principle under which an insurer that has paid a loss under an insurance 
policy is entitled to all the rights and remedies belonging to the insured against 
a third party with respect to any loss covered by the policy.”140  The relationship 
between subrogation and collateral source is fairly straightforward: 
“[S]ubrogation rules found in many jurisdictions retain the collateral source rule 
for important administrative and equitable purposes in the pre-verdict trial 
process.  Only where an insurer exercises its subrogation rights directly against 
the defendant does the collateral source rule lose its purpose and abrogation 
would appear appropriate.”141 
It is worth reviewing how each state treats subrogation.  Some states only 
recognize subrogation as an equitable remedy, including Connecticut,142 
Mississippi,143 Montana,144 Nebraska,145 Nevada,146 North Dakota,147 South 
Carolina,148 South Dakota,149 and Tennessee.150 
There is also contractual subrogation based on a specific clause in an 
insurance policy.151  States relying on contractual subrogation include 
                                                     
 140. J. Thomas Allen, ERISA Subrogation and Reimbursement Claims: A Vote to Reject 
Federal Common Law Adoption of a Default “Make Whole” Rule, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 223, 227 
(2009) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (8th ed. 2004)). 
 141. Todd, supra note 4, at 997. 
 142. See AJJ Enter., LLP v. Jean-Charles, No. 36838, 2015 WL 5797101, at *9 (Conn. App. 
Ct. Oct. 13, 2015) (holding that the decision as to whether to apply the doctrine of equitable 
subrogation is at the discretion of the trial court). 
 143. See Hare v. State, 733 So. 2d 277, 285 (Miss. 1999) (recognizing the make whole doctrine 
of equitable subrogation). 
 144. See Van Orden v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n., 318 P.3d 1042, 1045 (Mont. 2014) 
(permitting only equitable subrogation that follows the make whole doctrine). 
 145. See Jensen v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 684 N.W.2d 537, 541‒42 (Neb. 2004) 
(permitting only equitable subrogation that follows the make whole doctrine). 
 146. See Canfora v. Coast Hotels & Casinos, Inc., 121 P.3d 599, 604 (Nev. 2005) (permitting 
subrogation only when following the make whole doctrine). 
 147. See Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Ctr. Mut. Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 363, 378 (N.D. 
2003) (recognizing only equitable subrogation in certain circumstances). 
 148. See Langehans v. Smith, 554 S.E.2d 681, 683 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (recognizing equitable 
subrogation); but see Shumpert v. Time Ins. Co., 496 S.E.2d 653, 658 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (holding 
that equitable subrogation overrides contractual subrogation). 
 149. See Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Prehn, 238 N.W.2d 274, 277 (S.D. 1975) (holding that the 
make whole rule overrides contractual subrogation obligations). 
 150. Abbott v. Blount Cnty, 207 S.W.3d 732, 735 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that the make whole 
doctrine of equitable subrogation controls regardless of contractual provisions). 
 151. See Gary L. Wickert, The Societal Benefits of Subrogation, CLAIMS JOURNAL (Dec. 6, 
2012), http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2012/12/06/218682.htm. 
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Arizona,152 Arkansas,153 California,154 Idaho,155 Illinois,156 Indiana,157 
Kentucky,158 Maine,159 North Carolina,160 Vermont,161 and West Virginia.162 
Many state policies permit both equitable and contractual subrogation, 
including Colorado,163 District of Columbia,164 Iowa,165 Maryland,166 
                                                     
 152. See Kobold v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 309 P.3d 924, 927 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that 
subrogation can only be enforced if the insurance contract has an explicit subrogation clause). 
 153. See American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 753 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Ark. 1988) (holding 
that equitable subrogation is not enforceable; only contractual subrogation is enforceable). 
 154. See 21st Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 213 P.3d 972, 976‒77 (Cal. 2009) 
(recognizing the make whole rule, but holding that an insurer may specifically contract out of it 
and that only contractual subrogation is enforceable by law). 
 155. See Rinehart v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc., 524 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Idaho 
1974) (holding that contractual subrogation is not contrary to public policy). 
 156. See Schultz v. Gotlund, 561 N.E.2d 652, 653‒54 (Ill. 1990) (permitting subrogation only 
if expressly included in contract provision). 
 157. See Baxter v. I.S.T.A. Ins. Trust, 749 N.E.2d 47, 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (recognizing 
contractual subrogation and applying the make whole rule, but not recognizing equitable 
subrogation). 
 158. See Dodson v. Key, 508 S.W.2d 586, 587‒88 (Ky. 1974) (permitting contractual 
subrogation, but not equitable subrogation). 
 159. See McCain Foods, Inc. v. Gerard, 489 A.2d 503, 504 (Me. 1985) (permitting contractual 
subrogation, but not equitable subrogation). 
 160. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-48-20 (2014) (recognizing only contractual subrogation). 
 161. See Utica Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Cyr, 945 A.2d 361, 364 (Vt. 2008) (permitting contractual 
subrogation). 
 162. See Ferrell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 617 S.E.2d 790, 791, 793 (W. Va. 2005) 
(recognizing contractual subrogation). 
 163. See DeHerrera v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 219 P.3d 346, 350‒52 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009) 
(permitting both contractual and equitable subrogation and explicitly rejecting the make whole 
rule). 
 164. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 646 A.2d 966, 971 (D.C. 1994) 
(recognizing that subrogation can be equitable or contractual). 
 165. See Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heiken, 675 N.W.2d 820, 824‒25 (Iowa 2004) (recognizing 
both contractual and equitable subrogation). 
 166. See Roberts v. Total Health Care, 675 A.2d 995, 1001 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) 
(recognizing both contractual and equitable subrogation). 
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Minnesota,167 New Hampshire,168 New Mexico,169 New York,170 Oklahoma,171 
Pennsylvania,172 Rhode Island,173 Texas,174 Washington,175 and Wyoming.176 
Finally, there is statutory subrogation.  Many states retain statutory 
subrogation in conjunction with equitable and contractual subrogation, including 
Delaware,177 Florida,178 Hawaii,179 Kansas,180 Louisiana,181 Massachusetts,182 
                                                     
 167. See Westendorf by Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn. 1983) (equitable 
subrogation applies unless a contract provision explicitly provides contrary guidance). 
 168. See Chase v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 921 A.2d 369, 376 (N.H. 2007) (recognizing that 
subrogation can be equitable or contractual). 
 169. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 431 P.2d 737, 741 (N.M. 
1967) (recognizing equitable and contractual subrogation). 
 170. See Teichman by Teichman v. Cmty. Hosp., 663 N.E.2d 628, 630‒31 (N.Y. 1996) 
(recognizing equitable and contractual subrogation). 
 171. See Reeds v. Walker, 157 P.3d 100, 113 (Okla. 2006) (holding that an insurance contract 
is subject to the make whole rule unless the contract expressly states otherwise). 
 172. See Valora v. Pa. Emps. Benefit Trust Fund, 939 A.2d 312, 320 (Pa. 2007) (permitting 
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Michigan,183 Ohio,184 Oregon,185 and Utah.186  Meanwhile, a few states prohibit 
subrogation altogether, including Georgia,187 Missouri,188 New Jersey,189 and 
Virginia.190 
Having reviewed the states, one can only conclude that subrogation is alive, 
consequential, and unchanged by the implementation of the PPACA.  
Considering the fact that the rules are largely functional, the idea that the 
PPACA presented the opportunity to grossly tilt subrogation options and 
collateral source evidentiary limitations in favor of defendants is simply 
surprising.  Moreover, there are essential remedies in medical malpractice cases 
that exceed the amount an insurance company could recover through 
subrogation.  Given that tort recovery can include compensation beyond medical 
damages, (e.g., lost earnings, pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and 
diminished enjoyment of life), the scope of the compensable loss is broader than 
the scope of the insured loss.191 
Because there are few, if any, medical insurance policies that do not have 
subrogation clauses, it is difficult for an insured person to enter into a 
relationship with an insurance company without agreeing to a subrogation 
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clause.192  The notion that insurance companies need even more leverage, via 
the PPACA, is completely outside the stated purposes of the PPACA—a law 
designed to expand the coverage of health insurance and improve the quality of 
medical care. 
There is also the compelling argument that “the [PPACA] has no legal effect 
on the medical liability system and, therefore, is unable to create real reform in 
this area.”193  It is true, however, that damage caps and medical malpractice cases 
are very much part of the health care discourse.194  As discussed previously, the 
dialogue on future medical expenses and the collateral source rule is far from 
over.195 
Given the aforementioned facts, it is simply incorrect to assume that the 
PPACA would be the vehicle to undermine a patient’s legal claim to be 
compensated when he or she is the victim of medical malpractice or third party 
negligence.  The PPACA was neither designed nor written to serve such a 
perverse objective. 
Overall, damage caps are a terrible idea—a well-documented terrible idea at 
that.196  They artificially limit damages,197 deprive plaintiffs of much-needed 
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resources,198 undercut the deterrent effect of the tort system,199 skew settlement 
negotiations,200 and, theoretically, effectuate a wrongful taking.201  Furthermore, 
caps on noneconomic damages prevent juries from undertaking their mission or 
mislead them into believing they are engaged in individualized justice only to 
later see their efforts undone.202  Additionally, many argue that caps on 
noneconomic damages fail to reduce malpractice premiums or decrease total 
health care costs,203 and from an equitable perspective, caps are simply unfair to 
patients who have suffered because of a physician’s negligence.204 
Some jurisdictions have outright banned caps on damages.205  For example, 
in Lebron v. Geottlieb Memorial Hospital,206 the Illinois Supreme Court held 
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that a cap on damages violates the separation of powers clause in the Illinois 
Constitution because it infringes on a judge’s remittur power.207  In Atlanta 
Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt,208 the Georgia Supreme Court found 
that a cap on damages violated a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial.209  Additionally, 
as noted earlier, the Leung court considered the argument that the import of the 
PPACA was a constraint on damages for future medical costs—and then rejected 
it outright.210 
The fact that the PPACA’s boldest hope is that all persons have health 
insurance does not mean that “future care and treatment will be covered.”211  
Because the PPACA does not cover all future care and treatment, the medical 
malpractice, i.e., tort, system continues to serve an important purpose by 
providing plaintiffs the financial resources they need and deserve. 
IV.  COLLATERAL SOURCE AND CAPS 
Tort reformists believe caps on damages will drive down the cost of medical 
malpractice liability insurance; however, absent forced reductions by a state 
insurance commission, they do not.212  Notwithstanding the failure of caps to 
achieve anything other than reducing the accountability of negligent defendants 
and depriving funds for plaintiffs, defendants in malpractice cases have 
communicated the notable existence of the PPACA in an effort to skirt the 
collateral source doctrine, potentially limiting damages calculated in 
consideration of future medical care costs.213 
For example, defendants in medical malpractice claims advocate “that the jury 
should only award six months of future medical-care costs and the premiums, 
deductibles and co-pays for a bronze level health insurance coverage under the 
[PPACA] since full coverage would kick in after six months of uninsured 
status.”214  Insurance companies, as a result, are attempting to influence federal 
and state legislatures to consider any economic recovery that goes beyond 
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insurance payments to be a windfall.215  Some states, unfortunately, have 
reacted.  In a number of states, legislatures have enacted tort reform statutes that 
modify or eliminate the collateral source doctrine, which, in effect, “limit[s] 
economic damages to the amount the medical care provider accepted from the 
plaintiff’s health care insurer as satisfaction for the medical bills.”216 
There is no rational basis to assert that revealing existing insurance coverage 
at trial coupled with further damage caps will advance anything other than the 
bottom line for insurers.  States have, in many ways, already slashed recovery 
potential for injured patients.217  Believing that the PPACA would take a final 
bite of what remains is an erroneous interpretation.  Moreover, experience in the 
field suggests this outcome is at odds with the best interests of the public.218  
Several examples that support this assertion follow. 
In 1975, California enacted caps on medical malpractice with The Medical 
Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA).219  The MICRA imposes a 
$250,000 cap on compensation paid to victims for noneconomic injuries and 
eliminated the collateral source rule.220  Yet, even after the enactment of 
MICRA, malpractice liability insurance premiums continued to rise.221  Next, 
California enacted California Insurance Code Section 1861.01, known as 
Proposition 103, which required insurance premium rollbacks of up to twenty 
percent.222  Medical malpractice insurance premiums in California nevertheless 
stabilized; however, this stabilization was due to “the regulation of insurance 
rates, and not to caps on non-economic damage awards.”223  Finally, Civil Code 
Section 3333.1, part of the MICRA legislation, eliminated the traditional 
collateral source rule for medical malpractice cases and “allowed a shifting of 
the liability for a plaintiff’s medical-care costs from a defendant health-care 
provider to the plaintiff’s health-insurance company.”224  The statute also allows 
a defendant to present evidence of the plaintiff’s collateral source benefit, 
including health insurance.225  The California legislature rationalized that juries 
who knew about a plaintiff’s collateral source benefit would set damages at a 
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lower level.226  However, Section 3333.1 has done little to reduce increased 
insurance rates, generated little economic incentive to improve quality of care, 
and marginalized aggrieved patients by making it more difficult to find adequate 
representation.227 
The Texas legislature codified the state position on the collateral source rule 
in Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code Chapter 41.0105, which states that 
the “recovery of medical or health care expenses incurred is limited to the 
amount actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of the claimant.”228  In Haygood 
v. De Escabedo,229 the Texas Supreme Court, interpreting the statute, held that 
a claimant’s recovery of medical expenses are limited to those that have been or 
must be paid by or for the claimant.230  After Haygood, juries no longer heard 
evidence of the full amount of billed medical expenses, which reduces non-
economic damages figures and settlement amounts.231  As a result, damages 
calculated in consideration of “future medical expenses will be noticeably more 
complex than in the past,”232 and could, in jury trials, yield ineffectual and 
inaccurate damage awards.233 
A few other states have taken less direct approaches.  For example, Oklahoma 
permits admission into evidence of paid-for medical expenses,234 while a similar 
North Carolina statute limits evidence of medical expenses only to the amount 
paid.235  The Colorado legislature weakened the collateral source rule by 
requiring trial courts to reduce the victim’s damage award by deducting 
whatever collateral source benefits the victim received.236  Indiana Code Section 
34-44-1-2 allows the defendant to present evidence of write-offs or lowered 
payments to satisfy medical bills in a personal injury action.237  In Connecticut, 
courts allow evidence of collateral source payments and allow damages to be 
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“offset by the amount paid by collateral sources less any amount paid by the 
claimant to secure the benefit.”238 
There is simply no public benefit to consumers from this strained approach to 
tort and insurance law, and it is impossible to conclude that any interests were 
served beyond those of the insurance industry. 
Having reviewed the states, the question remains: does the PPACA further 
dilute the collateral source doctrine?  The answer is a resounding no.  As 
Professor Todd notes, the PPACA “appears to leave the collateral source rule 
unchanged despite the Act’s otherwise sweeping changes to the health insurance 
system and aspirations of providing universal healthcare coverage to all 
Americans.”239  To the extent it survives and prohibits the use of collateral 
sources, the collateral source rule saves jurors from making difficult calculations 
in an attempt to determine the actual medical damages paid by the plaintiff, a 
calculation that could drastically differ depending on the degree of insurance 
coverage.240  The rule simplifies this burdensome calculation to “a more 
straightforward, market-cost approach” more appropriate for jurors.241 
Consider the original intent of the collateral source rule. The rule was 
designed to prevent a tortfeasor from becoming unjustly enriched—not to 
prevent the victim from being compensated.  Nevertheless, a number of states 
that have enacted tort reform statutes now focus on preventing the injured party 
from receiving a windfall.242  It is unthinkable that additional remedial 
limitations are needed via the PPACA. 
Even after generations of legislative debate and the passage of the PPACA, 
which was undertaken with an eye to greater efficiency in delivering health care 
services, nothing in the PPACA embraces the mistaken notion that modifying 
collateral source or enhancing insurance subrogation options would affect a 
savings of any consequence. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The idea that the PPACA operates as a stealth vehicle for tort reform perverts 
obvious congressional intent.  Having failed to secure major federal tort reform, 
devotees of limiting accountability and restricting or eliminating access to the 
courts seized on the one successful piece of legislation they could find and 
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claimed that it was designed to limit liability, allow admissibility of collateral 
sources, and enhance subrogation rights.243  The PPACA does no such thing. 
The idea that the PPACA is technical tort reform designed to cap damages, 
render admissible collateral sources, or fundamentally change subrogation is 
absolutely wrong. For the PPACA to do so would change the civil liability 
system in a way that “undermines the traditional disincentives of tort law 
intended to compensate victims as well as to discourage negligent conduct.”244  
The PPACA is not a shadowy tinkering of the health care system designed so 
one item on the tort reform agenda could be achieved.  There are no covert lines 
in the PPACA, snuck in at the eleventh hour that suddenly resurfaced as a means 
to erode the rights of an injured patient or consumer.  This was the nation’s 
political system at its best, passing legislation that furthered big ideas, a grand 
vision affecting all.  When the PPACA is seen in that context, the notion that 
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